Without assuming any pdf for some measured parameter, we derive a predictive pdf for the outcome of a second measurement, given the outcome of the first measurement and two common assumptions about the noise. These are that (1) it is additive, and (2) it is of some known pdf. The argument is based on a Bayesian analysis of the noise when no pdf is provided for the value of the parameter. In this way we avoid assuming an ad-hoc prior. We clarify how this method of direct predictive inference is distinct from fiducial prediction. We specify the distinct flaw in the fiducial argument, and outline the importance of this development in the foundations of probability and statistics.
The main argument

Fundamental issues related to predictive inference
To use a plain example, let θ be an unknown real constant, not the result of any known random process. Two independent measurements of θ, with outcomes x 1 and x 2 , correspond to conditional random variables X 1 {θ=t} and X 2 {θ=t} . We assume that, conditionally on any possible value of θ, these are independent and distributed normally: X 1 {θ=t} ∼ N(t, σ 2 1 ) and X 2 {θ=t} ∼ N(t, σ 2 2 ), where σ 1 and σ 2 are assumed constant and known. The difference of the two outcomes, d ≡ x 2 −x 1 , corresponds to X 2 {θ=t} −X 1 {θ=t} , which is distributed normally with mean 0 and variance σ 2 1 +σ 2 2 , without reference to the value of θ. Therefore random variable D can be defined, following N(0,σ 2 1 +σ 2 2 ), and is not conditional on θ. Any random variable with this property is called pivotal or a pivot.
The pdf of D can be directly applied to generate the pdf for "x 2 , given x 1 " according to what has been called "direct" pivotal argument (as distinct from fiducial prediction) in [4] (p. 365). But this is not the end of the issue, because this argument relies on the premise that the pdf of D {x 1 =s} is the same as the pdf of D. To defend this claim, it is not enough to know that the distribution of D is independent of θ; one must also demonstrate that knowledge of x 1 does not make any difference (that is, x 1 by itself does not specify any recognizable subset of the reference class (or "reference set") associated with D (e.g.
[3] pp. 57-58, [5] , or [4] )). The problem has persisted for decades, because, lacking a mathematical demonstration of this claim ( [5] Sec. 4; [6] Sec. 7.2), conjectures about the post-data pdf of a pivot have been presumed by some authors on the basis of an intuitive conviction, starting with Fisher (e.g., see [6] Sec. 7.2), who has evoked a general version of this assertion in support of his fiducial argument. The inadequacy of a bare appeal to intuition has been outstanding since Fisher's assertion was checked wrong in a particular situation [8] which involves the t-distribution (for an outline see [4] p. 364).
Nevertheless this finding does not extend to our example. Moreover, in this work we submit a proof backing the claim that, in the case of location measurements, x 1 is irrelevant (by itself) to the pdf of D.
General considerations
Additive noise as a pivotal random variable
Each location measurement (here we label them by i = 1, 2, ...) can be thought of as involving a random process, generating noise E i of a known pdf f i (e i ), which is then added to the unknown parameter θ to provide an outcome x i . Our assignment of a pre-data pdf to E i is based on this assumption, which we call Assumption B i , or simply B i .
We shall employ a detailed notation for probability statements, to display the defining assumptions (the "context" or "reference class") which label the corresponding probability space. For instance, to state explicitly that the pre-data pdf of E 1 does not depend on (hypothetical values of) θ, we write
(That is, E 1 is a pivot.)
The suffix in a probability statement has a double role. Not only it denotes the random variable (here: E 1 ) which is associated with the indicated value (here: e 1 ), but also, when the random variable is continuous, it specifies the parametrisation used to represent the probability density function as a regular function.
In the following we shall focus on determining the post-data pdf of the error of measurement. This pdf can be expressed as Pr E 1 (e 1 |B 1 , "x 1 =s").
Disregarding the true value of the parameter
In the expression Pr E 1 (e 1 |B 1 , "x 1 =s"), the reference class is specified by two conditions: an assumption regarding the noise of this type of measurement, and an acceptance of the outcome of this particular measurement. As a technical excercise, if in the specification of the reference class we also included the hypothetical "true value of θ", as in Pr E 1 (e 1 |B 1 , "x 1 =s", "θ=t"), the pdf would collapse into the delta-function δ(e 1 −s+t), which is unspecified, therefore useless for predictive inference (besides, it does not contain any trace of the known properties of the measurement).
However, the general issue of selecting the reference class is still open; at any rate, it cannot be decided within the theory of probability. We cannot prove that it is wrong to include "θ=t" in the specification of the reference class. We rather point out some counterintuitive consequences of this choice, ultimately related to practical disadvantages.
A simple version of the same problem will arise if one tosses a fair coin, and immediately covers it with a bowl. Do we accept that the reference class consists of all such trials (disregarding that either 'heads' or 'tails' has already become a constituent of reality) so that probability of heads-under-the-bowl is 0.5, or do we restrict the refererence class to this single case, so that probability cannot be defined (except trivially)? With the first option, we stand to gain (in the long run) from betting against someone who wrongly believes that probability of heads-under-the-bowl is 0.6. Not so if we follow the second option.
The same problem arises in any application of Bayes' theorem, even if it is based on well-defined prior probability. Take for instance the interpretation of a medical diagnostic test, such as an HIV-antibody test. The lab procedure outputs the relative likelihood of infection, which then can be combined with prior probability based on information about the subject's lifestyle, using statistical tables, to derive the posterior probability of HIV infection. This analysis assumes that the reference class is the set of people with the same lifestyle. On the other hand, if one refuses to relax the consideration that the particular subject is either already infected or not infected, the probability of HIV infection cannot be defined (except trivially, that is, "either 0 or 1").
In view of these consequences of our options, we elect to include (or imply) the clause "disregarding the true value of θ" in the interpretation of a pivotal random variable, after the outcome is known, so that we prevent the collapse into a trivial reference class. A deliberate omission of this clause would amount to voiding the pdf of E 1 {x 1 =s} .
The impossibility of a fiducial argument
Fisher has emphasised repeatedly that the fiducial assignment of a pdf to the parameter requires a carefully considered specification of the reference class. (He uses the terms 'aggregate', 'population', and 'reference set', as cited in [6] .) However, when we follow this advice, we find that the fiducial argument is not sustainable.
Suppose (for the moment) that we have established the assignment of a pdf to E 1 {x 1 =s} ; we are not thereby justified to pair it with a corresponding pdf for θ, because it would conflict with the clause "disregarding the true value of θ" which is implied in the specification of the reference class. A striking incongruity looms in the sentence "the probability of θ being between t 1 and t 2 , disregarding the value of θ, is 0.95".
Here we divorce direct predictive inference from the fiducial argument, in terms of logical connection, yet it can be said that the two schemes are related in intention. In the words of A.P. Dempster [9] , "fiducial probabilities are intended for post-data predictive interpretation". Also F. Hampel [10] focuses on the predictive role of fiducial probabilities. We outline Fisher's position in Sec. 3.
Determination of post-data probability for additive noise
In relation to the issue "what is the pdf of E 1 {x 1 =s} ", one may also ask "how is this pdf updated if, on the next day, we learn that θ had been a random outcome of some process, with pdf π(θ)". The idea is that Bayesian updating applies in this case, as if the object of the measurement were the value of the noise, e 1 , and the direct information about θ were only part of the measurement process. 2 The pdf of E 1 {x 1 =s} will be identified with the prior of the alternate Bayesian treatment (since it is meant to apply when we lack any direct information about θ).
To present this argument clearly, let us denote by H the assumption that θ is the result of a random process, corresponding to a random variable Θ, of pdf π(θ). If H is accepted, then use of Bayes' theorem is justified for probability update, assuming an outcome x 1 .
In our case we also have the assumption of a location measurement. It is expressed in Eq. 1, which states the requirement that the pre-measurement pdf of the noise (E 1 ) be independent of [any hypothetical value that might be supposed of] θ. Note that the converse property is also true, trivially:
(∀ e) Pr Θ (θ|H, "e 1 =e") ≡ Pr Θ (θ|H) ≡ π(θ) . (2) That is, the prior pdf associated with θ is independent of [any hypothetical magnitude that might be supposed of] the error of this measurement.
Note the formal symmetry between (θ, H) and (e 1 , B 1 ), by comparing Eq. 1 with Eq. 2. 3 Therefore there are two Bayesian ways of deriving Pr E 1 (e|B 1 , H, "x 1 =s"). As a consistency check, let us compare the results of the two corresponding treatments.
A. The usual Bayesian treatment
In the usual treatment we first update the pdf of Θ, from π(θ) to the corresponding posterior pdf.
We apply the familiar Bayesian formula posterior pdf = prior pdf × likelihood × normalising constant.
The likelihood function for θ, given "x 1 =s", is defined up to an unimportant factor:
Considering the transformation from X 1 {θ=t} to E 1 {θ=t} ≡ X 1 {θ=t} −t, of Jacobian determinant 1, we obtain
From Eq.s 3, 4, and 1, we obtain
Note that the definition of the likelihood function does not involve H. (That is, with a different prior pdf for θ, or in default of any prior pdf, the likelihood function would be the same.) The posterior pdf of Θ is 4
focus his instrument for the purpose of determining those errors. Thus a given data set might serve two entirely different purposes; one man's 'noise' is another man's 'signal' " [11] Ch. 7. (Also in Ch. 8 he observes the mathematical "reciprocity" between random variable Θ and any ancillary random variable.) 3 This symmetry may be clouded because of certain properties that typically are desired for f 1 (e 1 )
without being required of it: we prefer that it average to zero, and that it also be symmetrical about zero; moreover, it is convenient that it follow the normal distribution. However, these properties being nonessential, there is no real issue here. Besides, when we want to perform a direct zero calibration of the apparatus, we usually select a π(θ) having the above properties. 4 Strictly speaking, if f 1 (·) is smooth, Bayesian updating cannot be based on the acceptance of "x 1 = s" because the probability of that occurence is zero for all values of θ. Instead of an exact value for x 1 , we consider some small interval including that value. In the first-order approximation we reckon the (conditional on θ) probability of this interval as the product Pr X 1 (s|B 1 ,"θ=t")× ∆x 1 . Therefore if the interval is small enough we apply the likelihood function defined in Eq. 3 as the first-order approximation.
In fact it is never possible to record x 1 exactly; it is always registered as a digitised entry, which is equivalent to some interval. Now we take advantage of the transformation from Θ to E 1 which is defined by E 1 ≡ s−Θ, of Jacobian determinant 1, to derive
B. The "instrument maker's" Bayesian treatment
In the alternate Bayesian treatment we update the pdf of E 1 , from f 1 (e 1 ) to the corresponding posterior pdf. Again we make use of a likelihood function but now it is the likelihood function for e 1 , given "x 1 = s". In analogy with the previous treatment, we define the likelihood function for e 1 , given "x 1 =s", without reference to B 1 :
Considering the transformation from X 1 {e 1 =e} to Θ ≡ X 1 {e 1 =e} −e, we obtain
(in the second step we have taken into account Eq. 2) so that the likelihood function is
Now we can derive the posterior pdf of E 1 , up to a normalisation factor:
As expected, Eq. 7 is equivalent with Eq. 6, so that the "instrument maker's" version of Bayesian updating is checked as accurate. The important point is, the prior pdf in this procedure, which is meant to apply as long as no direct information about θ is (yet) available, is just f 1 (e 1 ) . 5 In other words, we have determined the pdf of E 1 {x 1 =s} , and it turns out the same as the pre-measurement pdf of E 1 . We have shown that x 1 does not specify any recognizable subset of the reference class that is indicated by the clause "disregarding the unknown value of the parameter", with regard to random variable E 1 .
Justification of the direct pivotal argument
A corollary of the irrelevance of x 1 to the pdf of E 1 is that x 1 is also irrelevant to the pdf of D (defined in Sec. 2.1). This is due to the identities
We have already seen that the pdf of E 1 is unaffected by our knowing x 1 , and of course so is the pdf of E 2 . Consequently, so is the pdf of D. In notation,
We have solved the problem stated in Sec. 2.1, regarding the post-measurement pdf of D. In this way we have provided the foundation for the direct pivotal argument, so that we can produce the pdf for "x 2 given x 1 , disregarding the unknown value of θ". 5 If there is any doubt whether the pdf for the error is legitimate when we do not know of any pdf for θ, let us refer to the symmetrical situation, when we admit a prior pdf for the parameter regardless of the properties of the measuring apparatus, even regardless of whether there will be any measurement at all.
To obtain a concrete result, note that the pdf of D is the marginal pdf of E 2 −E 1 for any value of θ,
where ξ is a dummy variable. Considering the transformation from D {x 1 =s} to X 2 {x 1 =s} , we conclude that
This result is based on disregarding the true value of the parameter. By coincidence, fiducial prediction also results to the same pdf, which also coincides with the predictive pdf based on a uniform prior density for the parameter.
Discussion
Although the "direct" pivotal argument applies only with location measurements (a special case, even if not too uncommon) the importance of this analysis lies in showing an example of non-parametric predictive inference based on parametric models.
In another paper we shall extend this result in two ways: the predicted outcome need not be related to a location measurement, and the prediction may be based on any number of location measurements. However modest those developments appear in relation to the general case, the issues raised by them require careful treatment, so that they cannot be addressed in a short paper like the present one.
Here is a note regarding the distinction between direct and fiducial prediction. fiducial prediction as derived from fiducial probability of the parameter values; consequently the simplification he mentions is only a secondary issue. In the present work predictive inference is defined in the absence of any distribution for θ, therefore the possibility to also calculate it as if from some intuitive density function of the parameter is fortuitous, proved in the case of location measurements but not yet guaranteed to be generally true.
Conclusions
The error (or "noise") of a location measurement corresponds to a pivotal random variable. There is an issue regarding what is the appropriate reference class for interpreting this random variable after the outcome is known. We show that, if we want a non-trivial and a practically useful result, the reference class must be specified by the clause "disregarding the unknown value of the parameter". In this way we also preserve correspondence with the common usage of the term 'probability'. This clause prevents the application of the fiducial argument, so that no pdf for the parameter may be justified; fiducial prediction is also voided by this clause. However, the direct pivotal argument remains valid. It solves the problem of predictive inference, for location measurements, without any intermediate parametric inferece. In this way we have attained "pure" predictive inference; that is, not involving any inductive component; every step involves deduction only.
